The publication of Basil Haady’s article (“Homosexuality: The Big Debate”, pg 26) in the last issue of King’s Bench has effected a considerable reaction. Some of this has been negative: criticising our decision to publish the article, as well as the manner in which we have done so. However, much of the criticism of our decision to publish the admittedly controversial piece appears to have overlooked the direct rebuttal of the arguments of Mr. Haady in Richard Harmer’s article which we published simultaneously.
King’s Bench was established as a forum for debate amongst the student body. Our editorial decisions are therefore not based on our personal opinions; nor should they be. After much discussion of the sensitivities involved, the editorial team came to the unanimous decision that it was in the public interest that the extreme opinions which Mr. Haady’s article represents, were exposed, countered and subjected, as they indeed were, to rigorous analysis and constructive debate rather than suppressed and ignored.
The very fact of Mr. Haady’s article undermines the suggestion of some of our critics that in the United Kingdom at least further debate on the broad premises and misconceptions expressed in Mr. Haady’s article, objectionable as they might be to some, is redundant.
Moreover, our editorial choices are also informed in significant part by our international and multicultural setting and took account of much broader cross-cultural perspectives of homosexuality, which (between males) is still outlawed in as many as 83 countries.
The charge that the publication of Mr. Haady’s article was in some way an implicit endorsement of the views expressed, or worse, a threat to the wholesome community spirit within the student body at King’s is of the greatest concern to us. With the benefit of hindsight we can see how giving the subject-matter the title “The Big Debate” may have given an impression of moral equivalence of the views expressed. However “The Big Debate” is simply a template that the magazine designed to highlight the absence of editorial intrusion between competing or conflicting views or attitudes. The general disclaimer on page 51 reinforces this policy. Moreover, the overwhelmingly supportive reaction not just from the LGBT community but from the student body as a whole, evidenced in our personal correspondence as well as our public fora, happily negates the latter charge.
Finally, we acknowledge that the fact that the article was written under a pseudonym has been a matter of concern to some of our readers. We accept these and have since made it our policy not to publish anonymous articles.
We sincerely regret any offence caused by the publication of the article and hope that this editorial note will serve to reassure all our readers of the balance that we seek to achieve in promoting the constructive debate of issues in the marketplace of ideas. On the preceding page we publish a further rebuttal of Mr. Haady’s arguments by Professor Robert Wintemute and we will continue to post contributions from the student body on the messageboard of our Facebook group and on our website.
This was the winning essay in the King’s Bench Essay Prize 2008.
“[E]ven if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Community’s competence, the Member States are still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence,…Member States must nevertheless comply with Community law” [1]. This recent assertion by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is yet another illustration of burgeoning judicial and academic initiatives seeking to define the contours of the European Union’s respect of fundamental human rights (FHRs). Nevertheless, this initiative has been disputed, and therefore we must take note of the explicit steps that recent case-law has taken to ensure some EU protection of fundamental human rights. In this rather limited study, we shall therefore address the question of a necessity for such protection in the EU, examining only the paradigmatic debate regarding civil, social and political rights. This shall exclude the semantic debate as to the distinction of “fundamental” versus “human” rights, the former possibly designating the so-called “fundamental freedoms” protected by the EC Treaty. ‘EU’ law denotes all three pillars of the Union structure, and whilst the second and third pillars mainly concern intergovernmental action, through which Member States must respect their obligations under human rights treaties, we shall argue that the possible infringement of right by EU law as a whole necessitates protection. Finally, the notion of “need” rather than “should”, which is not neutral, seeks proof of an objective necessity for the EU legal order to include such a protection, a necessity recognised by positive law. Despite doubts as to the appropriateness of human rights protection at the EU level, the potential for human rights infringement (I) demands that EU law ensure human rights protection (II). Continue reading “Does EU law need to protect fundamental human rights?”
This essay placed second in the King’s Bench Essay Prize 2008.
Although the protection of fundamental human rights has occupied a progressively high status within the European Union, its development within the framework of EU law has been subject to a number of criticisms. A degree of scepticism exists regarding the European Court of Justice’s ability to enforce an adequate system of human rights protection within an entity primarily established as an economic institution. The ECJ has been criticised for attempting to act as another Human Rights Court, when the Strasbourg Court was already created with an express human rights jurisdiction. Similarly, it is argued that the ECJ has attempted to widen Community competences “through the back-door” by manipulating the rhetorical force of human rights to advance the commercial goals of the common market. This article seeks to demonstrate that these concerns only reinforce the necessity for a fully-fledged policy of human rights protection within the EU. A stronger commitment to ensure respect for fundamental human rights would provide the EU with the ethical foundations it has lacked as a result of its origins as a common market. This is reinforced in that the 2007 Reform Treaty confers legally binding status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and authorises the EU to acquire international legal personality. This allows for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, which would ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of human rights, whilst strengthening and legitimising their place within EU law. Continue reading “Does EU law need to protect fundamental human rights?”
This essay placed third in the King’s Bench Essay Prize 2007-2008.
This is a question that has three aspects to it. One avenue, that this question leads us towards, is whether human rights protection through the EU is excessive and unnecessary. Citizens of the European Union are already able to call upon rights granted by the European Convention on Human Rights. However, there also exists a European Charter on Human Rights. We can examine the requirement for additional protections, and find out if there is any gain to be made from having these as a part of the substantive European Union law. Another issue, which is more broad in nature, is to explore the correctness of interventions of the EU into matters such as these and the third aspect is the idea that the EU is compelled to protect fundamental human rights. The intention of this essay is to explore each one of these and it commences with the first matter stated above. Continue reading “Does EU law need to protect fundamental human rights?”
